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Introduction

Humanitarianism is needed to be more explored because it is a moral foundation of humanitarian assistance and humanitarian military intervention, which is providing a variety of issues for researchers in international politics and development studies and for practitioners on developing countries. Humanitarianism as philosophy is, however, hardly referred by such researchers and practitioners. But it is necessary to contemplate what is called humanitarianism before we explore practical or moral issues on humanitarian assistance and humanitarian intervention, because it is ethical and moral basis for humanitarian studies and practices.

There are at least three ways to understand humanitarianism from the fact that it is one of normative ideas and thoughts. The first is a legal approach. Some aspects of humanitarianism have been already enshrined in international humanitarian law, and we may comprehend humanitarianism in the arguments of international humanitarian law. The law is, however, only applied to international or internal armed conflicts, and excludes all cases of war-less time humanitarian actions for natural disasters such as famine, tsunami, or earthquake. Therefore, the legal approach is not enough to comprehensively understand humanitarianism.

The second is a social constructive approach. According to this approach, it might be possible to understand humanitarianism though inquiring an action guideline built by an international humanitarian organization, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is socially and historically constructed in interaction with other actors and the environment.
However, if we exceed the description of humanitarianism and proceed to justification for humanitarianism, the social constructive approach is not enough to comprehend a normative side of humanitarianism. This is because this approach may lead us to know that a humanitarian organization holds a guideline that humanitarian actions should be performed without permission from governments and other warring parties, for example, but does not guide us to discuss whether the organization should act on the guideline because we cannot acquire any criteria between right and wrong from this approach. If we will discuss the ethical side of humanitarianism, we should apply a normative approach to the research.

Medical science has medical ethics; bioscience has bioethics; business economics has business ethics; international politics has also the international normative theory and international ethics.\(^1\) The theory deals with what we should perform on international issues such as war and peace, distribution of wealth, sovereignty and self-determination, human rights, humanitarian military intervention, and global environment. The ways of interpreting and elucidating moral issues are various in the normative approach: normative ethics (deontological ethics, utilitarian ethics, and virtue ethics), legal philosophy, political philosophy and political theory, and religion.\(^2\)

In this article, I will analyze the normative aspects of humanitarianism, referring to deontological ethics and the theory of love originated by Immanuel Kant.

Of various issues on humanitarian ethics and practices are universality and impartiality of humanitarianism I will focus in this dissertation. The universal and impartial principles of humanitarianism can be derived from prescriptions in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and in the
Protocols, and from neutrality and impartiality principle in the Code of Conducts of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Universality is a principle that all people should be dealt without exclusion of some people. Impartiality is a principle that all people should be dealt without any distinctions.

The universality and impartiality principle of humanitarianism seem not to involve any moral defects, but we may be confronted with moral dilemmas on humanitarianism. Should we observe these principles always? Are there any exceptions on these principles? If there are exceptions, what are exceptions allowed? For instance, if we accept the universal and impartial principles, should we reduce our responsibilities for our families and treat them as others (a problem of mental distance)? Should we treat our neighbors as outdwellers (a problem of spatial distance)? Should we respond to a sick person just as a healthy person (a problem of distance to death)?

I will investigate such moral dilemmas on universality and impartiality of humanitarianism from the view of the distance between persons. Humanitarian ethics can be applied to a person-to-person relation as well as a person-to-group and a group-to-group relation, but I will limit the scope of the dissertation to an interpersonal relation, which should be a moral foundation of the two other relations. 3

Hereinafter, I will delineate the meaning of humanitarianism from love and proceed to the ethical aspects of humanitarianism and confirm that we ought to love all people over the world according to humanitarian ethics of love, and I will insist that we do not have to love all people.
impartially because of influence from familiarity. And then, I will maintain that we should help all
people over the world impartially in emergency when they are nearly dead and need help from us,
but the distinction allowed even in such cases is a distance to death, which is a degree of emergency
for life. Moreover, I will proceed to practical aspects of humanitarianism, and I will present the two
types of limits of implementation of humanitarian obligation from the view of a spatial distance.
Finally, I will insist that we ought to overcome the limits to accomplish universal humanitarian
practices.

1 Representative literature on international normative theory and international ethics is following:
University Press, 1992; Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political
Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979; Janna Thompson, Justice and World Order:
A Philosophical Inquiry, London: Routledge, 1992; Stanley Hoffman, Duties Beyond Borders: On
the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics, New York: Syracuse University Press,
1981; David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998; David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin, International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999; Gordon Graham, Ethics and International Relations,
Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1997; Andrew Valls, ed., Ethics in International Affairs:


3 Sovereign states, international organizations and non-governmental organizations should implement humanitarian obligations in so far as their objects and principles are compatible with humanitarianism. A group whose objects and principles have little correspondence with humanitarianism might not have any obligations based on humanitarianism, although a member belonging to such a group should fulfill humanitarian duties because any humans should maintain humanitarian responsibilities. Scholars in the English School international relations theory discuss whether governments should save suffered people beyond national borders and it should override sovereignty in the case of humanitarian emergency. I will not refer to nation state and sovereignty in this dissertation because it restricts the scope of inter-personal relations. See Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Nicholas J. Wheeler and Timothy Dunne, “Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will”, International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 1, pp. 91-107, 1996.
Chapter I: The Meaning of Humanitarianism

If we have inadequate knowledge of meaning and definition of the term we examine, what should we do carry on our research? One way of making progress in research is to consult academic dictionaries and lexicons in which the term is thought to be included. Such dictionaries and lexicons generally advert to a few dominating researchers and some representative articles and books about the technical term. Even if the dictionaries and lexicons do not refer to the term, we have no way other than looking up its meaning and origin in language dictionaries.

Humanitarianism is a normative idea and thought, and we may investigate its meaning and definition to consult dictionaries of philosophy, ethic or religion. If we cannot comprehend humanitarianism with the use of academic dictionaries and lexicons, we may proceed to use language dictionaries to understand what is called humanitarianism.

A. Humanitarianism in Technical Dictionary

I take a survey of more than thirty dictionaries and lexicons on philosophy, ethic or religion published in four languages. Only three dictionaries, however, provide us with information on humanitarianism, but the information is too insufficient to carry forward research for ethical and practical issues on humanitarianism.

*The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment* reveals the only aspect of enlightenment in humanitarianism and does not delineate humanitarianism as the whole because it focuses on
Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics was published in the early twentieth century. In this dictionary humanitarianism is defined from the view of animal protection, which is an argument of whether we should admit moral discrimination between humans and other animals. This argument exposes the discrepancies between *humanism* and *humanitarianism*; the latter contains kindness to animals and the former does not. It is also, however, insufficient to comprehend the general picture of humanitarianism because animal protection in humanitarian spirit is not relevant to the ethical and practical issues on universality and impartiality in humanitarianism.

The account for humanitarianism in this encyclopedia is inadequate and irrelevant, but it expresses an interesting description of humanitarianism. “[I]t should be noted that, while there are many books dealing with certain aspects of humanitarianism, there are very few that treat of the subject as a whole.” Although humanitarianism must be one of the important ideas and thoughts in moral philosophy, almost all of the dictionaries of philosophy, ethic or religion have no article of humanitarianism and the author who wrote the above-cited article adverted to that there were few books and articles dealing with humanitarianism as the main topic. The explanation can lead us to assume that there are very few comprehensive and reliable studies on humanitarianism. However, it does not indicate that humanitarianism is *not* one of significant moral ideas and thoughts, but rather may imply that we can comprehend humanitarianism with the use of other familiar and traditional concepts in ethics and religions. I will discuss this point later.

In short, the knowledge derived from the academic dictionaries and lexicons does not
B. Humanitarianism in Language Dictionary

Humanitarianism is a common and familiar word in European languages: *humanitarism* in French, *humanitarismo* in Spanish, *Humanitarismus* in German, *humanitaryzm* in Polish, and __________ in Russian. Humanitarianism in each language may have difference from other European languages, but the distinction may not be so decisive that we cannot understand general representation of humanitarianism, and I will choose the English word *humanitarianism* as a representative example of humanitarianism among European languages.

*The Oxford English Dictionary (second edition)* does not show us *humanitarianism* as an entry word, but it introduces a simple description for the concept in the last part of the article of *humanitarian*: “Humanitarianism [is] the system, principles, or practice of humanitarians.” It means that we can appreciate *humanitarianism* through understanding the meaning of *humanitarian*. According to *the Oxford English Dictionary, Humanitarian* as a noun (as a person) possesses three types of meaning.

The first meaning of *humanitarian* is that “[o]ne who affirms the humanity (but denies the divinity) of Christ.” The meaning is much limited to only one religious faction’s standpoint in Christianity, and it is inadequate to consider general aspects of humanitarianism.

The second meaning is that “[o]ne who professes the ‘Religion of Humanity’, holding that mankind’s duty is chiefly or wholly comprised in the advancement of the welfare of the human
race: applied to various schools of thought and practice.” Religion of Humanity is a religion with the basis on logic and reason, created by a famous sociologist Auguste Comte. The ideal of the religion seems to be analogous to humanitarianism, but we cannot assert that the religion coincides with a general meaning of humanitarianism.

The most important and last meaning is that “[o]ne who advocates or practices humanity or humane action; one who devotes himself to the welfare of mankind at large; a philanthropist.” The definition is more fundamental and comprehensive than the two former meanings, and can be the threshold of deliberating moral issues of humanitarianism. However, it is needed to clarify the meaning of three terms which are used in the definition of humanitarian: *humanity, humane,* and *philanthropy.*

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the first concept of *humanity* has two types of acceptation. The first is “connected with human: The quality or condition or being human, manhood; the human faculties or attributes collectively; human nature; man in the abstract.” The second is “connected with humane: The character or quality of being humane; behaviour or disposition to others. […] Civility, courtesy, politeness, good behaviour; kindness as shown in courteous or friendly acts, obligingness” and “[d]isposition to treat human beings and animals with consideration and compassion, and to relieve their distress; kindness, benevolence.”

The second concept of *humane* is the same as the second meaning of humanity, and it is possible to interpret two types of humanity. The one interpretation of humanity is humanity as human nature: human’s characters, conditions, capacities and attributes. The other interpretation of
humanity is humanity as human relationship: human’s behaviors and actions motivated by compassion on others. But the meaning of humanitarian also includes “one who devotes himself to the welfare of mankind at large” and this definition is closely connected with a relationship to others, and thus the latter one is much closer to the meaning of what humanitarianism is.\textsuperscript{10}

The third concept of philanthropy has ancient Greek word philia (love) and anthropos (human) as its root word, whereas humanity and humane have a common Latin word humanus (human) as its origin word. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, philanthropy denotes “[l]ove to mankind; practical benevolence towards men in general; the disposition or action effort to promote the happiness and well-being of one’s fellow-men.”\textsuperscript{11}

I will put together the information from the above-overviews from the language dictionary; humanitarianism means a universal love to humans and animals on the basis of humanity. The definition consists of two essences and one element in humanitarianism. The first essence is universality which means that we ought to take humanitarian practices for all human beings and animals.\textsuperscript{12} The second essence is humanity which means that we ought to perform humanitarian actions to act on humanity, not on divinity and religious scriptures.

However, we should investigate love as the third important element of humanitarianism because the scope of love may be broader than humanitarian love, and thus I will examine the meaning of love so that we comprehend humanitarianism.
It is clear that humanitarianism has humanity as its root word, but it is thought to be difficult to comprehend the meaning of humanitarianism from humanity. This is because humanitarianism is not the system, principles, or practice of humanity but of humanitarians. It is certain that humanity is a key term for humanitarianism, but humanity has a distance from humanitarians as well as vegetable does from vegetarians.

Humanitarianism is also a moral philosophy for animal protection, but I will limit the scope of the dissertation within the relationship between humans. We should pay attention that Kantian moral philosophy covers only people who are thought to have personality, and thus it excludes the
love for insane people who lose personality and for animals which have not possessed personality in nature.
Chapter II: The Meaning of Love and Humanitarianism

To search a technical term, we can consult a technical dictionary as discussed above. Additionally, we can have recourse to another way of understanding a word meaning. The way is to compare the word with the well-known synonyms. If we deliberate humanitarianism to be a type of love, the love on the basis of humanitarianism can be inquired to compare with other types of love.

I will adopt ancient Greek words of love to typify a variety of meanings of love. This is because ancient Greek language had many different vocabularies of love, and it also has even now superiority to other languages with various words of love. Ancient Greeks used the word of philia to express the feeling of love in their daily life, which is a root word for philanthropy, and ancient Greek philosophers discussed moral significance of philia in their arguments. Moreover, the Greek also had the word of agape although they were not more interested in agape than philia. It is, however, the most essential love of Christianity and was translated into caritas in Latin language when the word came into the Roman Europe, and caritas had been accepted in indigenous European languages, for example, charity in English.

Those who have the interests on moral value of love are not only European and but also Asian. Asian people have discussed the concept of love before the emergence of Christianity. Buddha preached on compassion for all animate beings without distinction between humans and animals in the fifth century B.C. in India. Mahayana Buddhism, a northern largest denomination of Buddhism accepted in Japan and China from the same period of the birth of Christ, developed more
profoundly the concept of compassion and relief for others (慈悲; ji-hi in Japanese; ci-bei in Chinese).

Confucius (Kong Zi), who was born in China and lived in a civil war age in the sixth and fifth century B.C., insisted that one ought to love their own family and state to keep family life and social order safe, and one ought to respect elder much more than younger people and men than women (仁愛; jin-ai in Japanese and ren-ai in Chinese; it represents a love between humans).

Micius (Mo Zi), who was also born in China at the same period of Confucius, criticized the love of Confucianism because the love for one’s own state sometimes corresponds to chauvinism and can urge us to hold hostility and to wage war against other states. On the contrary, Micius maintained a love for all people without any distinction (兼愛; ken-ai in Japanese and jian-ai in Chinese; it expresses philanthropy) and peace without war (非攻; hi-kou in Japanese and fei-gong in Chinese). The debate between Confucius and Micius appears to be similar to a current debate between communitarianism and cosmopolitanism.

Ancient Chinese and other Asian philosophers have been contemplating deeply the significance of love, but I will investigate the love of humanitarianism referring to some types of love in ancient Greek language, because it includes a variety of concepts of love as I mentioned. The criteria to differentiate humanitarian love from a-humanitarian love should be based on the definition of humanitarianism, especially two essentials of humanitarianism: universality and humanity.
A. Four loves

Leon Morris’s *Testaments of Love: A Study of Love in the Bible*, C.S. Lewis’s *The Four Loves*, Robert Fracelière’s *L’Amour en Grèce*, and Haruo Kaneko’s *Ordo Amoris* are one of prestigious studies on love in which ancient Greek words are adopted as a clue to explore a variety of meanings of love. Morris indicates that “[t]he Greek language is rich in words for love. Whereas English makes one word refer to a variety of loves, Greek preferred to use different words. This gave the Greek a precision that the English term lacks.”

Morris covers some of words for love in his work: *storge*, *philia*, *epithymia*, *eros*, and *agape*. *Philia* is a love which was familiar for Hellenic citizens and had been deliberately argued by classical Greek philosophers. *Agape* is a love which has been preached in Christianity throughout the world and discussed among Christian theological scholars over two millenniums. *Eros* is a love which has been often compared with *agape* or *philia* in ethical and religious books and articles to clarify differences among the three types of love. *Storge* has not been much focused in philosophy and religion, but the love of *storge* is the most fundamental to survival of human beings and other animals. To examine meaning of significance of humanitarian love, I will refer to the Greek words of love: *eros*, *storge*, *philia*, and *agape*.

B. Eros

Eros is described as an essential value for ancient Greek literature, and it corresponds to love romance and sexual love in current usage. Morris expresses that “[b]asically, eros is romantic
love, sexual love,"¹⁹ and points out two characteristics of eros: "[t]wo things are especially characteristic of eros: it is the love of worthy, and it is a love that desires to possess."

"The love of worthy" can be understood from our everyday experience; those who are loved do not have an equal value for all persons, especially in the context of sexual love. Clearly eros is a relative love because a man or woman has good looks in the eyes of a particular person not for all persons, and because a man or woman gives sexual love and romance for a particular person not for all persons. Therefore, eros is not compatible with humanitarianism in universality because eros is inherently limited to persons with sexual relationship.

"A love that desires to possess" means a one-sided desire to keep someone in love. To be more precisely, it means an attitude to reject the situation that someone you love is falling love with another person and even more gets married with. As can be seen from this considerations, eros is a love in an exclusive relationship, and it has totally different characteristics from humanitarian love.

C. Storge

Storge is a love for family members based on a blood tie and a shared livelihood. Morris expresses storge as “natural love” or “family love.” “It is the love that binds people in some natural group--- the love of the family, for example. Parents love children, and children love parents and children love one another.”²¹ “Natural love” and “family love” come in an exclusive community of family which it is almost impossible for a new member to enter without blood relationship except marriage and adoption, and which also impossible for an existing member to abandon except
divorce. Without storge in family life, mutual cooperation among family members is lost and we cannot reserve a family itself. Therefore, the love of storge is natural as Morris mentions.

The person in love of storge is generally perceived to be a worthy individual. For instance, parents love their children because their children are invaluable and irreplaceable for parents and vice versa. It is generally accepted that we ought to give the love of storge regardless to usefulness and pleasure of a person in love. Even if our children are not useful or does not give comfort to us, it should be understood that the love for family members is given because of worth as existence with a special tie rather than as usefulness and comfort.

The love of storge is given to members of family, and may not be applied to other family members because the motivation of storge is essentially a blood relationship. The relationship based on blood, however, can be adopted to bolster up a tie among members in other communities: a local and national community. It is well known that the discourse of “the common blood” has been recurrently used to convert different people into the same nations in foundation of a nation state. The love of storge may have a similar characteristic to the love for members belonging to the same local and national community because any governments in the modern world generally restrict entrance of outsiders to sustain interests of insiders as family does. In short, patriotism also can be contemplated to be one type of storge.

In addition, the love of storge based on blood connection can apply to all human beings because we have a common father and mother and we are their descendants with common genes on human nature. Therefore, all human beings are members of ‘global family’ with common ancestors,
and the love of storge can be applied to other persons beyond family membership.

Storge is the love for a family member because family members are worth for each others. If the love of storge is only applied to an exclusive community as family tied up by blood connection, it is not compatible with humanitarian love because of humanitarianism with the principle of universalism. However, if the love of storge can be applied to all humans on the basis of common ancestors and common blood, it can be thought to be compatible with humanitarianism.

D. Philia

Philia is a love for friends. The love of philia is applied to a friend with a common interest, and a person who does not have such common interest is excluded from the sphere of philia. Kaneko maintains on the characteristics of philia that “philia generally comes into existence in the koinonia--- a reciprocal intercourse between humans. Philia is a love between people with the same characteristics or circumstances like the adage like attracts like, and reciprocity on the basis of affinity is the foundation of the love of philia.”

The love of philia is a love in which one recognizes others to be worth for each other. If one loves people since we recognize him or her as useful and comfortable, the love is not thought to be the love of philia because it arises in equivalent relationship such that one is worth for others and others are worth for one.

The love of philia is given to persons with a common ground in their characteristics, interests or circumstances, and it does not be applied to persons who do not share with any common
bases. For instance, a feeling of oneness arises among persons sharing with a common philosophy, morality and religion, whereas an attitude of indifference and even hostility may arise against people with a different culture, custom and language.

The love of philia can be an exclusive love for foreign persons, but the affinity in that we all are human beings can provide us with the love of philia over mankind——the love is philanthropy. In this context, the love of philia is compatible with humanitarian love because of universality in persons.

However, the universality based on affinity in the love of philia may cause us to face with severe questions: who is human beings, who is entitled to be a human being, and which common grounds human beings do or should retain? One perceived as a human in modern society might not be a human in ancient society. It was called a slave. For example, slaves were objects that can be disposed in ancient Greece, and thus it is a logical consequence that the love of philia was not applied to the slaves because philanthropy was for all humans except slaves. Aristotle mentions the love of slaves in his famous work *the Nicomachean Ethics*.

“[T]here is no friendship or justice towards lifeless things. But neither is there friendship towards a horse or an ox, nor to a slave *qua* slave. For there is nothing common to the two parties; the slave is a living tool and the tool a lifeless slave. *Qua* slave, then, once cannot be friends with him. But *qua* man one can; for there seems to be some justice between any man and any other who can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement; therefore there can also be friendship with him in so far as he is a man.”

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From this Aristotle’s dictum, it is possible to contemplate that philanthropy was applied to all human beings except slaves. Such the discrimination is not specific phenomenon in ancient Greece, but is an everyday affair in even modern society. Barbarians, savages, lunatics and manias are often used to discriminate abnormal persons to keep a social order and peace for normal persons, and the terms of livestock and animal are sometimes in the wartime used to enemy nations to alleviate a feeling of sin in killing them. One expresses such expression and presumes some people to be a subhuman or a nonhuman to scorn them without compunction and exclude them from human community.

The inherent discrimination in the love of philia implies that the love for foreign persons cannot be given if the basis of the love depends on affinity. The love of philia cannot surpass a boundary between affinity and foreignness and only be a love for members within a closed community. It is justifiable that philanthropy covers a wide range of human community, but it excludes some people from the human community.

However, it is possible to consider that slaves and animals can be also the subjects of love of philia. Aristotle denied a common characteristic between citizens and slaves, but all of them have a common component in that we all are mortal beings. The logic is very analogous to Buddhism’s compassion. The compassion of ji-hi can be given to all animate things (衆生; syu-jyou in Japanese and zhong-sheng in Chinese) without distinction between humans and animals, and syu-jyou possess the common characteristic in that we all are alive. Buddhists respect animal life and are reluctant to kill and eat animals like Western vegetarians because humans and animals live in
the same sphere of morality.

The reciprocity in the love of philia, however, cannot be explained in this context. It is difficult to consider that humans love animals and animals love humans on the conditions of reciprocity because the animals are not only companion animals but also domestic livestock, reptiles, fins and insects.

Philanthropy is the love of philia throughout humans and is based on affinity and reciprocity. If there are no humans excluded from human community of love, philanthropy is compatible with humanitarian love. But, philanthropy cannot be applied to people excluded from the community because of slavery and are not compatible with humanitarian love because of the limits of universality. We need to contemplate different logic of love applied to people who are aliens and even enemies.

E. Agape

The love of agape is God’s love for all men and man’s love for neighbors in *The Old and the New Testaments*. The neighborly love can be reduced to God, because God himself is love and the man’s love for neighbors comes from the God’s love. The fourth section of *the First Letter of John* shows “[d]ear friends, let us love one another, because love comes from God. Whoever loves are a child of God and knows God. Whoever does not love does not know God, for God is love.”

This is because God is a creator of the world according to *the Genesis*, and thus God also creates worthiness of existence and bestows on us love inclusive of the neighborly love.
What characteristics does the love of agape contain? Morris insists that we can deeply understand the love of agape comparing with the love of eros. “[A]s good as a way as any of grasping the new idea of love the Christians had is to contrast it with the idea conveyed by eros. As we have seen, eros has two principal characteristics; it is a love of the worthy and it is a love that desires to possess. Agape is in contrast at both points: it is not a love of the worthy, and it is not a love that desires to possess. On the contrary, it is a love given quite irrespective of merit, and it is a love that seeks to give.”

Therefore, the love of agape is a love given despite person’s worthiness. This is because God is a creator of all values including love and sin, and God bestows his love on all people including even people committing a sin. Moreover, it indicates that even human’s love for neighbors comes from the God’s love because love itself is created by God. The love for neighbors must be bestowed upon all humans including even a sinful man and woman.

The investigation into The New Testament clarifies that the neighborly love of agape can be given regardless to his or her worthiness. In the third section of the Paul’s Letter to the Galatians, “[t]here is no difference between Jews and Gentiles, between slaves and free people, between men and women; you are all one in union with Christ Jesus.” Apparently from this quotation in The New Testament that the sphere of love is over a boundary between races, classes, and sexes. In addition, the fifth section of the Gospel according to Matthew, Christ Jesus charged the following Torah “[I]love your friends, hate your enemies” and preached that “love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you.” Christ taught the love for neighbors beyond a distinction
between friends and enemies.

Moreover, the love of agape is unilateral and asymmetrical. Such characteristic of agape can also be extracted from the narrative on the origin of the world in Christianity. The relationship between God and humans is also unilateral and asymmetrical because God creates all existence and value on the world without any help from humans. The love of agape must succeed to the characteristics in the relationship between God and humans because love itself is emanated from God.

The conducts of love for neighbors are unilateral donation, not reciprocal exchange. The anecdote of the Parable of the Good Samaritan in the tenth section of the Gospel according to Luke is familiar with Christians. “There was once a man who was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho when robbers attacked him, stripped him, and beat him up, leaving him half dead. …. [A] Samaritan who was traveling that way came upon the man, and when he saw him, his heart was filled with pity. He approached to him, poured oil and wine on his wounds and bandaged them; then he put the man on his own animal and took him to an inn, where he took care of him. The next day he took out two silver coins and gave them to the innkeeper. ‘Take care of him,’ he told the innkeeper, ‘and when I come back this way, I will pay you whatever else you spend on him.’”

Christ preached that the Samaritan’s act was a real practice of neighborly love and ordered a rabbi to do the same practice as the Samaritan did. The Samarian did save the nearly dead person not because of interests from the sufferer, but because of only good conscience. The love of agape with characteristics of unilateral contribution is contrasted to the love of philia of mutual
reciprocity of interests.

Morris concludes the love of agape in the following sentences: “[t]hat love means the cross, for God will do whatever is needed --- even make a supreme sacrifice--- to save the sinners he loves. … [I]t is way to love (in the sense in which the Bible uses the term) to sacrifice for others, to undergo the cross for the sake of beloved sinners. God’s love is not simply a beautiful but detached emotion --- it is a love that pays the price.” Christ chose to sacrifice himself with love for even people who crucified him upon a cross and threw stones at him. His sacrifice represents the highest and noblest expression of love and the perfection of the neighborly love.

The spirit of self-sacrifice in the love of agape might be so sacred that we cannot reach the state. It can go over boundaries between races, classes, and sexes, but may not overcome an asymmetrical relationship between Christians and non-Christians. Christians are a practitioner for the love of agape whereas non-Christians are a barbarian ignorant on the sacred love. Therefore, the asymmetrical characteristic in the love of agape will be an incentive of enlightening the ignorant barbarians so that non-Christians should be emancipated from the dark world and should be proselytized to Christianity. It is doubtful in this case that non-Christians have a chance to reject the religious conversion and maintain their religious faith because of the unilateral and asymmetrical character in the love of agape.

It becomes obvious from the above considerations referring to The New Testament that the love of agape has two sided characteristics: universal love regardless to person’s worth and unilateral and asymmetry love without reciprocal interaction. Comparing with such characteristics
of love of agape, I will explore meaning and significance of humanitarian love. Charity is generally recognized as one of humanitarian practices, and it is well known as a relative word of *caritas* in Latin language and *agape* in ancient Greek language. It is presumed from the term’s root that humanitarian love is at least linked to the love of agape. Charity is generally perceived as an act for others rather than for couples, families or friends; charity has also the element of universality beyond any boundaries. And charity is generally contemplated as an act without contemplating something in return; charity has also the feature of the unilateral and asymmetrical offer like the love of agape.

However, humanitarian love is totally different from the love of agape in the following respect. The agape of love is based on God’s love whereas humanitarian love is based on humanity as I argued above. The agape of love cannot arise from only humans and even human’s love for neighbors cannot come into being without God. Humanitarian love based on humanity must be realized from humans without God.

F. Four Loves and Humanitarian Love

Hitherto, I have clarified the meaning of humanitarianism comparing with four loves coming from ancient Greek language. I will summarize the characteristics of humanitarianism in this section.

The two essential characteristics of humanitarianism are universality for people and humanity as motivation. Four loves can be classified into universal love and partial love, but some
loves can have both types of loves coincidently. What can become a universal love are *storge*, *philia*, and *agape*. Firstly, *storge* is a love for family members with the basis of blood relationship, and thus it is generally given to a close and exclusive community with a special tie. It is natural that the love of storge can be applied to all humans because humans are thought to be born from a common father and mother. Secondly, *philia* is a love for friends with common interests, characteristics or environments, and the love of philia is motivated on commonality and reciprocity. Philia can be applied to all humans because we are common as a human, and we can respect for other’s worthiness and love each other. Thirdly, *agape* is a love for people regardless to worthiness and it is given to people on unilateral basis, not reciprocal. The love of agape is quite contrast to philia in that the former can be given to even aliens and foreigners without common moral basis and the latter is given to people with something common.

Storge and philia can be universal love but cannot exceed boundaries between inside and outside communities, and between commonality and foreignness. Above discussed, the boundaries can bring exclusive persons or groups into existence such as slaves, barbarians, savages, mad and abnormal men. Humanitarianism cannot be thought to accord with distinction and discrimination among humans, and thus historically humanitarianism has been a movement to emancipate slaves and barbarians in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Moreover, charity is well known to have a word root of *caritas* in Latin which was translated from *agape* in ancient Greek language. It is natural that the love of agape is much fit to the ethics of humanitarian love than storge and philia.

However, when people who love others in the meaning of agape may impose religious
conversion on slaves and barbarians to emancipate from the uncivilized world, the love of agape retrogresses to an oppressive one-sided love in which propagandists neglect and ignore one's will, custom, and culture. The attitude deviates from humanitarian spirit because humanitarian love must be “disposition to treat human beings and animals with consideration and compassion, and to relieve their distress” whereas oppressive conversion as one aspect of agape is given without consideration and compassion and gives their distress. Therefore, humanitarian love must be given to correspond with their will and feeling, and at least allow them to reject oppressive love.

Humanitarianism has also another integrant as humanity, and it means humanitarian love arises in the heart of humans, does not come from God and other types of virtuous and religious existences. Humans love each other in the context of eros, storge and philia and these loves come from human’s will and feeling, whereas the love of agape, even as the neighborly love, does not come from humans but from God because God creates a love itself according to The Old and The New Testaments. Agape is premised on God, whereas humanitarianism is premised on human’s disposition with consideration and compassion to alleviate others distress. Therefore, we should inquire into the theory of humanitarian love with two characteristics like both universal love of agape and human’s love of storge and philia.


According to Morris, *Epithymia* is a passion and it “denotes strong desire, and in Greek writings generally it is often used to refer to sexual desire and thus may denote a passionate love” (Morris, *Testaments of Love*, pp. 119-120). It is possible to set aside epithymia in consideration of the dissertation because it has no relevance to humanitarian love. According to Flacelière, there are other Greek works for love other than *eros, storge, philia*, and *agape: eunonia* (benevolence and devotion), *pothos* (desire), and *mania* (passion) (Robert Flacelière, *L’amour en Grèce*, p. 156).

Morris, *Testaments of Love*, p. 120.


28 *The Gospel according to Matthew*, 5: 43-44.


Chapter III: The Kantian Love Theory and Humanitarianism

Philosophers both in West and East have pursued significance of love over the centuries. And one of the philosophers who formulate the duty of love for neighbors on the basis of humanity and universality is Immanuel Kant. Humanitarianism is universal love based on humanity as I mentioned, and thus it may be possible to explore the meaning of humanitarianism with the Kantian love theory.

A. The Kantian Love Theory

Kant asserts in his work *the Metaphysics of Morals* that love is not just feeling but practice. His idea of love becomes clearer in the following quotation. “[L]ove is not to be understood as feeling, that is, as pleasure in the perfection of others; love is not to be understood as delight in them (since others cannot put one under obligation to have feelings). It must rather be thought as the maxim of benevolence (practical love), which results in beneficence.”

Kant also connects the theory of love with the most significant principle in his moral theory “do not treat others as means but as only ends.” The duty of love for one’s neighbor can, accordingly, also be expressed as the duty to make others’ ends my own (provided only that these are not immoral).

Kant explains why the love becomes the duty for us. “By carrying out the duty of love to someone I put another under obligation; I make myself deserving from him.” If we want to be
given love and kindness by someone, we ought to give love and kindness to him or her. Judged from this respect, the moral foundation in the Kantian love theory corresponds to the principle of reciprocity in the love of philia.

However, Kant does not put the moral basis on commonality with esteem of other’s worth as the love of philia does; “[i]n accordance with the ethical law of perfection “love your neighbor as yourself,” the maxim of benevolence (practical love of human beings) is a duty of all human beings toward one another, whether or not one find them worthy of love.” The love for neighbors in Kant’s argument corresponds with the love of agape in that we ought to love others without relation to his or her worth.

Kant classifies the love for neighbors into beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy. “Benevolence is satisfaction in the happiness (well-being) of others; but beneficence is the maxim of making other’s happiness one’s end, and the duty to it consists in the subject’s being constrained by his reason to adopt this maxim as a universal law.” We should pay attention to the sentence of “beneficence makes other’s happiness one’s end.” It means that we ought not push our own views of happiness on others and ought to treat others according to other’s view of happiness.

Beneficence is also a duty for others in Kant’s explanation, and its specific meaning and moral reasoning become clearer in the following quotation. “To be beneficent, that is, to promote according to one’s means the happiness of others in need, without hoping for something in return, is everyone’s duty. For everyone who finds himself in need wishes to be helped by others.”

Gratitude is closely related to beneficence because those who give beneficence to others
and deserve to achieve gratitude from the beneficiaries. The relationship is reciprocal based on morality and not contractual between right and obligation on the basis of law. According to Kant, “Gratitude consists in honoring a person because of a benefit he has rendered us. The feeling connected with this judgment is respect for the benefactor (who puts one under obligation), whereas the benefactor is viewed as only in a relation of love toward the recipient.”

Gratitude is also a duty for others in The Kantian moral theory. “Gratitude is a duty. It is not a merely prudential maxim of encouraging the other to show me further beneficence by acknowledging my obligation to him for a favor he has done (gratuarum action est ad plus dandum invitiatio), for I would then be using my acknowledgement merely as a means to my further purpose. Gratitude is rather, direct constraint in accordance with a moral law, that is, a duty.”

Compassion is generally thought as a feeling for others, and Kant also admits that compassion is a feeling built in human’s heart, but he denies using this feeling as a means to pursue other’s happiness. “Sympathetic joy and sadness (sympathia moralis) are sensible feelings of pleasure or displeasure (which are therefore to be called “aesthetic”) at another’s state of joy or pain (shared feeling, sympathetic feeling). Nature has already implanted in human beings receptivity to these feelings. But to use this as means to promoting active and rational benevolence is still a particular, though only a conditional, duty.”

Compassion is closely linked with humanity according to the Kantian love theory. “It is called the duty of humanity (humanitas) because human being is regarded here not merely as a rational being but also an animal endowed with reason. Now, humanity can be located either in the
capacity and the will to share in other’s feelings (humanitas practica) or merely in the receptivity, given by nature itself, to the feeling of joy and sadness in common with others (humanitas aesthetica). The first is free, and is therefore called sympathetic (communion sentiendi liberalis); it is based on practical reason. The second is unfree (communion sentiendi illiberalis, servilis); it can be called communicable (since it is like receptivity among human beings living near one another. There is obligation only to the first.”

According to Kant’s the Metaphysics of Morals, humanity is sensitivity to other’s feeling but it is not a duty of beneficence with compassion to other’s unhappiness but a moral basis to enhance other’s well-being in accordance with other’s will for his or her own happiness. Because humanity is one of the meanings of humanitarianism in the Oxford English Dictionary as I mentioned, humanitarianism can be well understood in the context of the Kantian love theory.

The Kantian love theory can overcome oppressive beneficence in the love of agape introducing the duty of respect. Respect is not also just feeling but practice as love. “It is not to be understood as the mere feeling that comes from comparing our own worth with another’s […]. It is rather to be understood as the maxim of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person, and so as respect in the practical sense (observantia aliis praestanda).”

The duty of respect is also closely linked to the most significant principle in his moral principle: “do not treat others as means but as only ends.” “The duty of respect for my neighbor is contained in the maxim not to degrade any other to a mere means to my ends (not to demand that another throw himself away in order to slave for my end).”
The duty of respect is bound to the duty of love. “Love and respect are the feelings that accompany the carrying out of the duties. They can be considered separately (each by itself) and can also exist separately (one can show him the respect necessary for every human being regardless of the fact that he would hardly be judged worthy of love). But they are basically always united by the law into one duty, only in such a way that now one duty and now the other is the subject’s principle, with the other joined to it as accessory.”

Linking with love and respect, human relationships can be kept in moderation because love makes us connect with each other but respect makes us part from each other in a suitable distance. “In speaking of laws of duty (not laws of nature) and, among these, of laws for human beings’ external relations with one another, we consider ourselves in a moral (intelligible) world where, by analogy with the physical world, attraction and repulsion bind together rational beings (on earth). The principle of mutual love admonishes them constantly to come closer to one another; that of the respect they owe one another, to keep themselves at a distance from one another; and should one of these great moral forces fail, “then nothingness (immorality), with gaping throat, would drink up the whole kingdom of (moral) beings like a drop of water”.”

The duty of respect provides us with protection of human dignity and accomplishment of humanity. “Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect every other. Humanity itself is a dignity; for a human being cannot be used merely as a means by any human being (either by others or even by himself) but must always be used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists, by which
he raised himself above all other beings in the world that are not human beings and yet can be used, and so over all things. But just as he cannot give himself away for any price (this would conflict with his duty of self-esteem), so neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary self-esteem of others, as human beings, that is, he is under obligation to acknowledge, in a practical way, the dignity of humanity in every other human being. Hence there rests on him a duty regarding the respect that must be shown to every other human being."

Humanitarianism is one of the universal loves and human loves. The theory of love in the Kantian moral philosophy shows moral reasoning of the love for others, which have the same characteristics of universality and humanity as humanitarianism, and thus we can adopt the Kantian moral philosophy on the duty of love to interpret humanitarianism.

B. The Kantian Love Theory and Humanitarianism

Humanitarianism is universal love, and universality can be interpreted on the basis of the duty of love in the Kantian moral philosophy. On the one hand, the universality in the love of philia can be accomplished by commonality and reciprocity, but it is not sufficient universality because the love of philia cannot be applied to those who are not seen to deserve of worth such as slaves and barbarians. On the other hand, the universality in the love of agape can cover such worthless people because all creatures and values were created by God.

Kant interprets the universality of love in the following reasoning: humans should love each other because of reciprocity (beneficence from others and gratitude to others) regardless to
worthiness of persons. Kant’s moral reasoning of love for neighbors has both characteristics in the love of philia and agape, and universality in humanitarianism can be thought to be the love based on reciprocity without regard to worthiness of persons.

Humanitarianism is human’s love, and humanity can be construed by the Kantian love theory. The love of philia is also human love, whereas the love of agape is not human’s, but God’s love and the love for neighbors cannot exist without the God’s love in Christianity. Kant denies divinity to arise love among humans like the love of agape and affirms humanity to generate humans love like the love of philia.

Humanity has two different and connected aspects in the Kantian love theory: humanity as compassion and humanity as dignity of humans. According to the duty of love we may have a feeling of compassion to others and ought to use the compassion to abide by the duty of love and beneficence, whereas according to the duty of respect we have dignity as a human because of the duty of self-esteem and ought to observe the duty of respect for others. It can be possible to interpret from the Kantian love theory that humanitarianism is the philosophy of love for all humans, and the motive of humanitarianism comes from the feeling of compassion and the aim of humanitarianism is to protect human dignity throughout the world.

Humanitarianism is the love with universality and humanity, and it is restricted by the duty of respect in the Kantian love theory. The combination between respect and love for others keeps us to be in a suitable distance, and the duty of respect forbids us to impose our love and beneficence on others and to neglect other’s hope and will.
In the beginning of searching the meaning of humanitarianism, looking it up in a language dictionary is one of the elementary ways of inquisition but provides us with two essentials of humanitarianism: *universality* and *humanity*, and one element of *love* in humanitarianism. I have examined what love means by comparison with ancient four Greek words, and then we have found some important elements of love: *commonality, reciprocity* and *worthiness* of humans. The Kantian love theory supplies us with the three relationships of love: *beneficence, gratitude*, and *sympathy*, and the first two relationships show reciprocity principles and the last one itself is humanity. Moreover, it represents that the limit of love corresponds to the duty of respect. It is certain that Kant did not create the love theory to interpret what is called humanitarianism, and it is definite that the Kantian love theory can lead us to acquire achievements of understanding profoundly humanitarianism.
Universal love has been discussed in various religions and philosophies over centuries. For instance, philanthropy in ancient Greek; the love for neighbors in Christianity; *ji-hi* (compassion) in Buddhism. Some of these philosophies have been disputed over the middle and modern ages. However, understanding the meaning of humanitarianism needs to explore the love with the basis of humanity, not divinity.

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Chapter VI: The Universality and Impartiality of Humanitarianism

The dissertation possesses two aims as I mentioned in the Introduction. On the one hand, I will inquire into the meaning of humanitarianism because it is the most important foundation to consider moral and practical humanitarian issues. Without comprehending humanitarianism, we cannot accomplish reliable studies on its normative and practical issues. The investigation into the Kantian love theory will provide us with the important and essential clues for humanitarianism.

On the other hand, I will explore the universality and impartiality in humanitarianism. The principles of humanitarianism seem to be with an inherent moral dilemma. Is the difference in treatment between family members and unfamiliar people, between neighbors and outdwellers, and between healthy people and sick and injured people, allowed according to humanitarianism? If the moral dilemmas will be raveled out, we can acquire a clue for the moral issue on the distance in assistance which Peter Singer and other philosophers have been arguing.

A. The Meaning of Distance

There are arguments on the distance between persons in the context of humanitarian assistance. It has been argued since Peter Singer, a leading American moral philosopher, insisted that “[i]t makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor’s child ten years from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away.” It is not difficult, however, to conceive of a contradiction against the Singer’s argument, for example: “does it make
no moral difference whether the person I can help is my own child or an unknown child?” Moreover, communitarian thinkers set up an influential objection that we ought to help my own family members, friends and neighbors more warmly than unknown persons. 49

I will arrange the concept of distance and adopt three types of distance to explore the scope and the limit of universality and impartiality in humanitarianism. The first is a mental distance between persons; one is familiar and others are unfamiliar. There is an important normative issue: how universality and impartiality in humanitarianism are limited by the love for particular people with familiarity such as lovers, family members, friends, and neighbors.

The second is a spatial distance between persons, and it restricts the help of others and the universality of humanitarianism. The first and second distance has been already argued among moral philosophers, but the third distance---distance to death---is the most important distance to understand humanitarianism. The distance is changed by the degree of suffering and it directly affects the degree of emergency in helping others. The distance to death is an only exception of impartiality in humanitarianism.

I will explore the scope and the limit of universality and impartiality in humanitarianism with the use of three distances.

B. The Duty of Love in Humanitarianism

(1) Universality

Humanitarianism is the universal love, and it seems to be impossible to compatible with a
particular love with familiarity. It is certain that humanitarianism as universal love is incompatible with the particular love when one uses the particular love to exclude some people from the scope of love. For instance, one cannot love enemies because of friendship and cannot love aliens and foreigners because of patriotism. It is not unusual that patriotism provokes chauvinism even in modern society, and anti-foreignism is an attitude against humanitarianism.

However, if it does not bring exclusion of others from the scope of love, the particular love can be consistent with humanitarianism as a universal love. People love even enemies because of human love, and people love friends because of friendship. Because the attitude does not exclude anybody in love except different motivations and, does not break the universality, it can be allowed from the aspect of humanitarianism. Therefore, it cannot be denied that humanitarianism does not eliminate the possibility of compatibility with patriotism in which one loves his or her fellow people and cosmopolitanism in which one loves people throughout the world.

And then, does humanitarianism allow a distinction in the degree of love according to the mental distance without any exclusion? The attitude is, for example, that one loves more familiar people than unfamiliar people without exclusion of unfamiliar people from love. There is a complicated dilemma in the international society whether humanitarianism is compatible with the attitude that one does not exclude foreigners in the domain of love, but one does much further love his or her patriots. Here, I will contemplate the impartiality in the duty of love from the view of the mental distance in persons.
(2) Impartiality

Impartiality of Love and Mental Distance

To examine the impartiality in the duty of love, I will deliberate whether one can love others as himself or/and whether one ought to love others as himself.

Kant insists that one acts on the duty of love for neighbors only if the person does love all human being though the love for familiar people is thicker and warmer than the love for unfamiliar people. Kant’s opinion on the impartiality in the love for neighbors is summarized in the following quotation: “the benevolence present in love for all human beings is indeed the greatest in its extent, but the smallest in its degree; and when I say that I take an interest in this human being’s well-being only out of my love for all human beings, the interest I take is as slight as an interest can be.”\(^{51}\) Moreover, Kant maintains that “it is quite obvious that what is meant here is not merely benevolence in wishes, which is, strictly speaking, only taking delight in the well-being of every other and does not require me to contribute to it (everyone for himself, God for us all); what is meant is, rather, active, practical benevolence (beneficence), making the well-being and happiness of others my end. For in wishing I can be equally benevolent to everyone, whereas in acting I can, without violating the universality of the maxim, vary the degree greatly in accordance with the different objects of my love (one of whom concerns me more closely than another).”\(^{52}\)

It is possible in ideology that one ought to love others as much as one loves herself, her family or her friends, but it is difficult in reality to do that. Therefore, the imperative “love your neighbors like yourself” is significantly low in possibility to accomplish from the view of practice.
Impartiality of Love and Two Types of Duty

However, the moral significance in the duty of love for neighbors does not diminish despite its least possibility to act in practice. That can be understood by two types of obligation: perfect duty and imperfect duty. Cicero is believed to introduce the classification of obligation, and Kant and other philosophers have succeeded Cicero’s classification and have explored the meaning and significance of two types of obligations. The perfect obligation according to Kant is a duty which external sanctions---lawful or societal---are imposed on those who do not accomplish, and a duty which should be performed on all occasions---in that, a necessary and imperative duty. The duty to forbid killing people is one of the most important perfect duties in human relationship and social order. On the other hand, imperfect duty is a duty which internal sanctions (self-reflection) are only imposed on the people who do not act on, and a duty which one does not have to perform in special occasions---a meritorious duty. The duty to love your neighbors like yourself is one of the most significant imperfect duties in our daily life.

The imperfect duty is more meritorious than the perfect duty, because imperfect duty can be accomplished by persons with high virtue whereas perfect duty can be easily attained by even ordinary persons. Imperfect love is, however, not irreverent to our daily life, and it can be thought that we ought to accomplish the duty as much as possible. For example, it is almost impossible to accept that one can love all human beings as himself or herself, but also it is dubious to admit that one does not have to love like that. If the duty of love for neighbors is a duty, it is right to interpret
that we ought to love others as much as possible, because the most essential aims of life are to accomplish the perfection of self and the happiness of others according to Kant’s *The Metaphysics of Morals*.

Therefore, humanitarian love should be given all humans including people with familiarity, but rather it is usually seen as humanitarian to give love for familiar people even to unfamiliar people as much as possible.

C. The Duty of Help in Humanitarianism

According to Kant’s considerations on the duty of love for neighbors, the benevolence of universal love is the greatest in the scope but the slightest in the degree. However, Kant’s accounts of the love for neighbors can be thought to be incompatible with the famous anecdote of *Good Samaritan* in The New Testament.

This anecdote is a tale that a heathen Samaritan helped an unknown person who was nearly killed by a burglar and collapsed onto the roadside. Even if a person needs other’s help like in such case, is it morally right that all we have to do is to show the slightest interests and benevolence as Kant insists? It is morally allowed that the degree of love is varied according to familiarity because the duty of love for neighbors is imperfect love but is it morally allowed in all occasions and situations?

We often face the moral dilemma as like even in the modern global society. For example, when Hutu militias massacred Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus in Rwanda in the summer of
1994, is it morally allowed us to just show our slightest interests in the victims of genocide?

(1) Impartiality

The Duty of Help and the Distance to Death

The love for neighbors in Kant’s moral philosophy is the duty in which one should make other’s end my own. It amounts to the result that those who are suffered from ill health can get more benevolence than those who are healthy, for example. If those who cannot survive without other’s help as the tale of the Seminarian, it is not ethically right for us to vary the degree of love according to familiarity. I will create another type of duty in such emergency case--- the duty of help.

In the emergency when people ask us to help and cannot survive without other’s help, we ought to bear the duty of help. The duty of help is derived from the prohibition of killing others because we ought not to leave someone to his fate if he wants to survive. Therefore, it is contrary to the duty of help for us to take an attitude of showing the slightest interests before the needy people--- the victims of Rwandan genocide.

The prohibition of killing a person is a perfect duty because sanctions in law and society are usually imposed on perpetrators. However, the duty of help is not perfect duty because sanctions are seldom imposed on onlookers. The reason of no sanctions on onlookers is that the omission of help does not always bring sufferer’s death and the sufferer may survive with the help of another saver. And thus, the duty of help as imperfect duty allows us to vary the degree of help.

The duty of love is allowed to vary the degree according to the mental distance
(familiarity), whereas the duty of help is allowed to vary the degree on the distance to death. Why does familiarity permit us to change the degree of love? If one should help all humans as much as possible, one had better help those who cannot survive without other’s help first, and one does not have to rescue healthy persons not appealing us to help. The degree allowed in the emergency varies on the distance to death. It means that we all should have saved the victims of Rwandan genocide to respond his or her pains though they are not familiar to us.

The Duty of Help and the Mental Distance

The degree of help can be varied according to the distance to death, but is it morally right that the degree can be based on the mental distance such as nationality, race and nation, philosophy and religion? For example, some of Serbs militias and Bosnian governments in the Bosnian War endeavored to extract humanitarian assistance from international society to save their adherents, and to prevent enemies from acquiring international assistance. Because of non-cooperative attitude of warring parties, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees cannot help aiding with the basis of population ratio of each ethnicity instead of the degree of suffering.

The assistance according to the mental distance in such case leads us to help the same nations though they do not need any help. The duty of help is the duty in which one ought to help those who cannot survive without other’s help, and thus one ought to help others who need assistances no matter who are friends or enemies. Any boundaries of community such as family, region and nation states lose their moral significance when we are confronted with an emergency.

However, there might be feasible objections that the moral boundaries cannot be ignored
even in emergency because people inside the community with disaster can help sufferers more rapidly than outside the community. But, this is not derived from the mental distance but from the spatial distance which I will give account in the next section.

(2) Universality

It can be morally allowed in emergency that we discriminate between unhealthy and healthy persons. It implies that the limit of impartiality in the duty of help lies in the distance to death. In the meanwhile, where is the limit of universality in the duty of help? If we cannot physically practice a duty, it is generally thought that the duty cannot be imposed on us. The conditions which make implementation of the duty impossible correspond to the limit of universality in the duty of help. What are the conditions to prevent us from practicing the duty?

The Opportunities of Recognition and the Capacities of Help

The first limit is the opportunities of recognition. If one cannot recognize the needy people, one does not have to observe the duty of help. Even if there are so many suffered people who need other’s help and anyone cannot recognize them, the duty to help cannot be imposed on anyone except sufferers themselves.

The second limit is the capacities of help. If savers have insufficient capacities to help sufferers, the savers cannot be charged with the duty of help because it is impossible to help them. Regarding the definition of the duty of beneficence, one only has to practice beneficent acts within his or her capacities.
The two physical conditions depend on the spatial distance between savers and sufferers. If two sides are distant, there is no opportunity to recognize each other and no capacities for savers to help sufferers, and thus savers do not have to help sufferers. Therefore, it is much important in humanitarian assistance to access to sufferers.

Access to Sufferers and Interruption to the Access

Interruption to the access between savers and sufferers is an act which keeps distance between them and which make humanitarian assistance impossible. For instance, Serbs encompassed the city of Srebrenica in the eastern Bosnia in the early of 1993, and they disconnected water and electricity for confined Muslim displaced persons. The Serbs’ acts brought humanitarian emergency where Muslims died of fatigue and starvation one after another. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees endeavoured to rescue the sufferers from the city by trucks. However, Bosnian government criticized the humanitarian actions as helping Serb’s ethnic cleansing, and the UNHCR was pushed into the cessation of deliverance.

Such conducts preventing humanitarian assistance remove the last occasion of rescue for suffers and abandon them to his or her fate though they will ask help, and therefore the conducts are inimical to the duty of help in humanitarianism.

Enhancement of the Opportunities of Recognition and the Capacities of Help

The duty of help is restricted by the limit of possibility to help sufferers, but since the duty is imperfect duty we should perform the duty as much as possible. We ought to enlarge the opportunities of recognition and improve the capacities of help for all human beings who cannot
survive without other’s help. Global media and international humanitarian agencies mediate savers and sufferers through giving and taking information and materials, and they contribute to universalize humanitarian practices beyond the boundary of communities or nation states.

Technical developments in communication means have been enhancing the opportunities to recognize victims of war or natural disease indirectly by television, news magazines, and internet websites and to communicate with them directly by telephone, videophone, and e-mail. The globalization of communication leads us to have more responsibilities for helping them.

Transmitting the request of help is not according to the mental distance but following the distance to death. The tendency in the news on war victims sometimes brings more hate and hostility than the enhancement of human love and desire for peace. For instance, Serbs and Croats in Bosnian War used the same photo of a child killed by bombing to intensify hostilities against enemies, no matter which nations the child was killed by.

Medical developments have been augmenting the capacities to help sufferers of war or natural disease. And international humanitarian organizations and these workers have been cultivating the frontiers of global humanitarian assistance. Their geographical scope is also expanding from Europe to Asia and Africa, from urban areas to countryside, and from border zones and buffer areas to battlefronts, and then the distance to sufferers is diminishing. Moreover, the objects of rescue are expanding from injured and sick combatants to war prisoners, noncombatants, refugees and internally displaced persons. For instance, the Red Cross and Red Crescent was founded by the 1870s in nineteen European countries and Peru, Turkey, and Japan. By the 1920s,
the countries had been increased to sixty-nine countries such as China, Korea, Thailand, Egypt and Ethiopia. Nowadays there are 181 Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in the world. The Red Cross and Crescent becomes the window to accept humanitarian materials and donations from other countries and international organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. This contributes to creation of universal framework of humanitarian assistance.

The act of help must be based on the distance to death, and it must not be performed on the mental distance between saver and sufferer. We must not provide the help with the people because of their race, nation, citizenship or religion and must act on only how they are suffered.

(3) The Subject of the Duty of Help

What is the duty for general people who do not engage in the work for mass media or international humanitarian organizations? The duty of help can be considered a duty for general public even if we can recognize sufferers through mass media and have sufficient capacities to help them with humanitarian assistance provided by international humanitarian organizations. It is, however, the duty depends on our own ability to rescue and thus we will achieve our own duty even if we donate money or goods to professionals in humanitarian organizations, for instance.


Kant makes a clear distinction between the perfect and the imperfect duties; the perfect duty is “*duties of right (officia iuris)*, that is, duties for which external lawgiving is possible” and the imperfect duty is “*duties of virtue (officia virtutis s. ethica)*, for which external lawgiving is not possible” (Kant: Die Metaphysik der Sitten. S. 239; Kant (trans.), *The Metaphysics of Morals*, p.31).


57 The following book is used as reference on a date of foundation of Red Cross or Red Crescent in each country. Hans Haug, *Humanity for All: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement*, Berne; Stuttgart; Vienna: Paul Haupt Publishers, 1993, pp. 633-645. The following website serves useful information on the current establishment of Red Cross and Red Crescent. http://www.ifrc.org/address/
Conclusion

The limit of universality in humanitarianism in emergency corresponds to the limit of our occasions to recognize sufferers and our capacities to help them. However, the duty of help holds a meaning of helping as much people as we can; therefore, I argue that we ought to observe the duty to expand our occasions to recognize and develop our capacities to help. The impartiality in humanitarianism in rescue can not be accepted the discrimination by the mental distance in the relationship between saver and sufferer, but can be accepted the distinctions depending on how serious the suffering is. This is the only discrimination in emergency. Every person must be imposed this duty of help to observe the principles of universality and impartiality, which is the duty beyond boundaries any community and states.

As a result of these arguments and conclusions, some implications could be arisen hereinafter.. Firstly, it is implied that people who have more capacities to help must be imposed a heavier responsibility of rescue. Because it depends on capacities of rescue, the duty of help imposes the richer in capacities more heavily than the poorer in community and international society. For instance in our daily life regarding to rescue, emergency service officials and medical staffs have the higher obligation to rescue sufferers than ordinary people because of the difference of capacities. The same reasoning can be applied to the international society. It can be implied from variant responsibilities of savers that the people with sufficient resources, abilities, knowledge, and information have higher obligation to rescue sufferers or victims in war and natural disasters who
cannot get any protection and assistance from their own government.

The implication may ethically support the standpoint of Solidarism in the English School, which prefers human rights and humanity as the core value of international society to sovereignty and non-interference principle of states.

Secondly, we should not impose help on sufferers but should implement the duty to reply sufferer’s requests. The duty of love is to maintain a distance between you and others balancing the duty to respect. The duty of beneficence, one of the duties to love neighborhood, is a duty which makes other’s ends my own according to others’ view of happiness, and thus beneficence cannot be imposed on others. We have to act on between the duty of help and the duty of love in emergency. It means that we also should not impose beneficence on others without consideration of other’s hope and will even if they are nearly dead and needs other’s assistance. This implicates that humanitarian military intervention implementing as a part of international sanctions must be a reply to the request of sufferer (not the request of suffered states).

Lastly, humanitarian military intervention could be the act of deviation from humanitarianism if it contains violate sanctions against people or groups who commit even anti-humanitarian crimes. The duty of help is for all people, and therefore it does not disappear for the people who commit war or genocide. The duty of help is for all people, and thus we ought to help even the people who ask and need others’ help committed war crimes or genocide.

According to international humanitarian law, injured and sick persons and war prisoners who cannot survive without other’s help should not be excluded from object to aid. Because it
admits the distinction based on the distance to death, the duty of help for the people who committed anti-humanitarian acts is required. In other words, the distinction between a good person and a bad person does not matter to the duty of help.

Therefore, these sanctions and punishments for international crime must be imposed by law, and must not be by morality and ethics, and humanitarianism. The violation of the duty of humanitarianism in concordance with international criminal law can be punished as the crime against humanity. The idea of humanitarianism is, however, an idea of requiring humanitarian treatment even in the case of punishment to the criminal of war or genocide, and it does not require violate sanctions as enforcement measures based on the resolutions of the Security Council in the United Nations. Humanitarianism rather requires judicial trials in the international criminal court under protection of due process of law and humanitarian treatments for the detained people.

Humanitarianism is one of ideas and thoughts, and it can be misused as political ideology by protagonists to pursue their interests as in the case of humanitarian intervention. However, the duty of humanitarianism is the duty of love which makes others’ ends my own according to others’ view of happiness, and also it is the duty which is implemented through the duty of respect to protect human dignity— humanity. Any act deviating from the duty of love and respect cannot be the act on humanitarianism even it is called “humanitarian.”